Legislation and Policy Brief
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 1

1-6-2011

War Courts: Terror's Distorting Effects on Federal
Courts
Collin P. Wedel
Stanford University, cpwedel@stanford.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Military, War and Peace Commons
Recommended Citation
Wedel, Collin P. (2011) "War Courts: Terror's Distorting Effects on Federal Courts," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb/vol3/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legislation and Policy Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

7

WAR COURTS:
TERROR’S DISTORTING EFFECTS ON FEDERAL COURTS
Collin P. Wedel*
Preface.................................................................................................7
I.
Introduction.............................................................................9
II. Habeas Corpus and the Suspension Clause...................14
III. Military Detention and Criminal Incarceration......21
IV. Criminal Procedure..............................................................29
		 A. Miranda Protections..............................................29
		 B. Tribunal Procedures in Federal Courts. .................33
V. Conclusion..............................................................................37

Preface
In recent years, federal courts have tried an increasing number of suspected terrorists. In fact, since 2001, federal courts have convicted over 403
people for terrorism-related crimes.1 Although much has been written about
the normative question of where terrorists should be tried, scant research exists
about the impact these recent trials have had upon the Article III court system.
The debate, rather, has focused almost exclusively upon the proper venue for
these trials and the hypothetical problems and advantages that might inhere
in each venue.
The war in Afghanistan, presenting a host of thorny legal issues,2 is now
the longest war in United States history.3 This means that the federal courts
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2011; B.A., Pepperdine University, 2008. Prospective Law
Clerk to the Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
2011–2012. I am deeply grateful to Janet Alexander for her wise insights, precise criticisms, and
thoughtful comments in helping me to arrive at and fully develop this topic; to Professor Stephen
I. Vladeck for his invaluable and path-breaking investigative research into Abu Ali’s trial, for
which I am enormously indebted; to Sarah Wedel and Lauren Kulpa for their keen revisions; to
Peter Conti-Brown for his exhortations and guidance; to the staff of the Legislation and Policy
Brief for their sharp editorial refinements; to my family for their support; and to my wife for her
unwavering love and patience.
1.
Nat’l Security Division, Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and
Terrorism Related Convictions 9/11/01–3/18/10 (2010). This report also includes a list of all
Category I and Category II criminal statutes under which prosecutors successfully charged these
403 terrorists.
2.
See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring) (noting that
“[t]he legal issues presented by our nation’s fight with this enemy have been numerous, difficult, and to a large extent novel. What drives these issues is the unconventional nature of our
enemy: they are neither soldiers nor mere criminals, claim no national affiliation, and adopt longterm strategies and asymmetric tactics that exploit the rules of open societies without respect or
reciprocity.”).
3.
See Rick Hampson, Afghanistan: America’s Longest War, USA Today, May 28, 2010, at A1.
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have never endured wartime conditions for so long. As a result of this prolonged martial influence, it is clear that this war is corroding federal court
jurisprudence. My research represents a first attempt at synthesizing what
impact the war in general, and terror trials in particular, have had upon the
federal courts. I argue that the hypothetical fear of “seepage” has become concrete. Indeed, judges already admit that the war has taken a regrettable toll on
courts’ opinions.4
In a trend that should alarm both tribunal proponents and detractors alike,
tribunals and criminal trials are gradually growing to resemble one another.
While efforts to improve the military tribunal system have enjoyed a fair level
of success,5 long-entrenched Article III standards are deteriorating at a pace
that mirrors the pace of tribunals’ improvements. A cluster of recent cases,
proposed bills, and regulatory actions have narrowed the gap between Article
III courts and military tribunals considerably. When viewed as a whole, these
blurred lines between the military and domestic spheres draw the federal courts
into disquieting congruity with the tribunal system.
I argue that these decisions and bills have altered (1) habeas jurisprudence,
(2) detention policy, and (3) criminal investigatory procedure. More specifically, I contend that, as a result of a decade of federal courts accommodating the government’s campaign against terror, the criminal justice system is
beginning to resemble the very military tribunals that were once the antithesis
of Article III courts. In Part II, I discuss how the federal judiciary’s perspective on habeas corpus review has shifted dramatically even since the beginning
of the global war on terror. In Part III, I argue that recent court decisions and
administrative agency actions have created an Article III-sanctioned indefinite
detention system that is almost indistinguishable from Guantánamo Bay. In
Part IV, I observe that courts have relaxed their threshold evidentiary requirements to a point that is strikingly similar to those of military tribunals. In
short, courts are becoming military commissions that convict.

4.
See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 882 (“This war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written. Falling back
on the comfort of prior practices supplies only illusory comfort.”).
5.
See David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, New Rules on Terror Custody Being Drafted, L.A. Times,
Apr. 16, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama administration is for the first time drafting classified guidelines
to help the government determine whether newly captured terrorism suspects will be prosecuted
or held indefinitely without trial . . . .”).
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I. Introduction
There exists an ongoing debate about where to detain and how to
try alleged terrorists.6 After the events of September 11, 2001, politicians and scholars alike grappled with an array of questions posed by
the novel circumstances facing America. It was not readily apparent
whether America was “at war.” As a result, it was unclear how best to
characterize America’s enemies. The most difficult question this lack
of clarity presented was a simple issue of venue: should suspected terrorists be tried as criminals in a federal court or as quasi-soldiers in a
military tribunal? For the last decade, the answer to that question has
been “both.” The United States has tried and convicted terrorists in
both federal courts and in military tribunals for similar bad acts.
Maintaining these two justice systems is, by any measure, a
Sisyphean labor. Although both aim ostensibly to achieve the same
retributive, punitive, and protective goals, the two systems were
intended to be very different.7 Such differences are necessary, tribunal
supporters argue, because tribunals are a military venture designed to
be entirely distinct from Article III courts.8 Military tribunals — and the
detention centers holding future tribunal defendants at Guantánamo
Bay, Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, and elsewhere — are
tailored to the exigent needs of a martial judicial system that exists
entirely outside the Article III court system. For both supporters and
detractors of the tribunal system, the differences between the two systems are precisely what drive the debate about military tribunals. For
supporters, tribunals’ deviations from Article III norms afford the government sufficient flexibility to employ evidentiary procedures and
retributive measures otherwise unavailable in a federal court setting.9
America’s “war” against terror, the argument goes, necessitates a system constructed outside Article III standards. For tribunal opponents
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004); Janet Cooper
Alexander, Jurisdiction Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1193 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047
(2005); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan L. Rev. 953 (2002); Neal Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (2002); Charlie Savage,
Obama Team Split on Tactics Against Terror, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2010, at A1; Charlie Savage & Scott
Shane, Experts Urge Keeping Both Civilian and Military Options in Terror Trials, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
2010, at A15.
7.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann & Mark Martins, Detention Policy Task Force, to
the Attorney General & Secretary of Defense (July 29, 2009) (on file with Brief), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/documents/preliminary-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf, (“Military commissions that
take into account these concerns are necessarily somewhat different than our federal courts, but
no less legitimate.”).
8.
See id.
9.
See, e.g., John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 573, 574 (2006) (“The days when society
considered terrorism merely a law enforcement problem and when our forces against terrorism
were limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, federal prosecutors, and the criminal justice
system will not return.”).
6.
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who believe that Article III courts should try terrorists as criminals,
however, the methods and procedures used to maintain the tribunal
system are unnecessary and constitutionally offensive.
Tribunal opponents have long argued that military tribunals suffer from severe constitutional infirmities.10 Despite recent tribunal
improvements,11 this remains painfully true,12 especially since the government has not yet found an administrable way to determine what
types of terrorists belong in a tribunal system.13 In response, these tri10.
See, e.g., David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo
Military Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131, 201 (2008) (“The United States’ post-9/11
implementation of military commission trials has been a national embarrassment, adversely impacting the country’s standing in world public opinion while doing nothing to improve national
security.”).
11.
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948–950 (2009); see also Joanne Mariner,
A First Look at the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Part Two, FindLaw’s Writ (Nov. 30, 2009),
http://writ.news. findlaw.com/mariner/20091130.html. The Military Commissions Act of 2009
improves upon the 2006 version in several notable ways. The 2009 Act refines the definition of
America’s present conflict to encompass the expanded scope of military actions against Al Qaeda,
Taliban, and other associated groups. See § 948a(7). It bars statements made as a result of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. See § 948r. With regard to admissible evidence, it requires a
military judge to examine the “totality of the circumstances” in deciding whether evidence would
impact the defendant unfairly. See § 948r(d)(3) (defining these circumstances to include “[t]he
lapse of time, change of place, or change in identity of the questioners between the statement
sought to be admitted and any prior questioning of the accused”). Finally, it vastly augments defense resources in response to vocal concerns about the 2006 Act. See § 948k. In addition, the 2009
Act remedies the 2006 version’s bold statement that Geneva Conventions could not be invoked as
a source of rights. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g) (2006).
12.
See Editorial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2010, at A24 (“If the Obama administration
wants to demonstrate that it is practical and just to try some terrorism suspects in military tribunals instead of federal courts, it is off to a very poor start.”). Indeed, the 2009 Military Commissions
Act, like its predecessor, grants unprecedented jurisdiction to military commissions. It mirrors the
language from the 2006 Act granting commissions jurisdiction to try defendants for “purposeful
and material support” of terrorism. This muscular jurisdictional grant led the Solicitor General’s
office to argue that a “little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan,” an English teacher with an al-Qaeda-affiliated pupil, and
a journalist who refuses to disclose information about Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts to protect
her sources would all be subject to trial by tribunal. See In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting transcript from oral argument). In the course of litigation, however, President Obama’s Department of Justice has utilized a marginally more nuanced
approach when prosecuting terrorism supporters versus terrorism perpetrators. Although the
language remains unchanged, it appears that the Department of Justice has conceded its inability
to maintain a classification broad enough to covers jihadists in Afghanistan along with Swiss
grandmothers.
13.
White House officials have admitted that the Administration’s uncertainty about the consequences of capturing alleged Al Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh led the White House to order his
assassination rather than capture him alive. See David Cloud & Julian Barnes, U.S. May Expand
Use of its Afghan Prisons, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278-79
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting). In Goldberg, Justice Black laments in his dissent that perverse results
will often be obtained in systems that produce uncertain outcomes: “The Court apparently feels
that this decision will benefit the poor and needy. In my judgment the eventual result will be just
the opposite. . . . While this Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will be taken
off the rolls . . .it will also have insured that many will never get on the rolls, or at least that they
will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility.” Id.
Similarly, by maintaining such an extensive “menu” of options for captured terror suspects, the
government may insure that it will find some way to prosecute or punish captives once caught.
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bunal opponents posit that the surest way to remedy tribunals’ constitutional failings would be to abolish the system and try terrorists
as criminals in Article III courts.14 While the tribunal system has not
been abolished, it has certainly languished in desuetude, bringing just
three detainees to trial.15 More tribunals are planned,16 but notions that
those plans will come to fruition remain dubious. Conversely, between
September 11, 2001, and March 18, 2010, federal courts convicted 403
people for terror-related crimes.17 In late 2009, Attorney General Eric
Holder declared that future terrorist suspects would be presumed eligible for trial in federal court.18 Moreover, regardless whether military
commissions are wise or even administrable, they cannot be used in
many circumstances. Although instances of terror plots have reached
an all-time high,19 most of the recent plotters have been United States
or British citizens.20 Americans, however, are precluded from military
tribunal trials,21 and British citizens are practically barred from them
for diplomatic reasons.22 Therefore, it appears that the majority of contemporary terrorists will be tried in Article III courts.
The greater amount of process needed to make such a determination, however, will insure similarly that the government will assassinate, rather than capture, many terror suspects, like Ali
Saleh, whose fate is harder to predict.
14.
See, e.g., Military Commissions Shouldn’t Be Used; Pentagon Rules Shortchange Justice, Human
Rights Watch (June 25, 2003), http://hrw.org/ english/docs/2003/06/25/usdom6178_txt.htm.
15.
Of these trials, all have suffered from severe idiosyncratic defects. See David Glazier, A SelfInflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 131 (2008).
16.
Military Commissions, U.S. Dep’t of Def, http://www.defense.gov/ news/commissions.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (listing names of proposed commissions cases).
17.
See Nat’l Sec. Div., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18.
See Editorial, The K.S.M. Files, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2010, at A26. Despite this presumption, this
debate is far from over. There are several bills pending in Congress that would strip Article III
courts of jurisdiction and funding to hear terror cases. See infra notes 133-140.
19.
See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Coming to America: We’re Likely to See More Attacks on U.S. Soil by AlQaida Affiliates, Slate (May 5, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2253051 (“[O]ne thing seems
clear: There is a growing danger of attacks on U.S. soil by groups affiliated with, but not formally
part of, al-Qaida.”); Timothy Noah, Why Now?, Slate (May 4, 2010), http://www.slate.com/
id/2252905 (noting that recently foiled terror attempts by “Zazi, Abdulmutallab, and Shahzad are
probably more than just a statistically quirky cluster. They constitute circumstantial but compelling evidence that al-Qaida has stepped up its efforts to attack the United States in response to a
perceived or real lowering of our guard.”).
20.
See Paul Cruickshank, Homecoming, Newsweek, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/
id/216472. According to Cruickshank, “Twenty years after Al Qaeda was founded, an average of
about one American resident had joined its ranks every two years. Suddenly, though, in the spring
of 2008, this slow trickle became a flood. In the past 18 months, at least a half dozen recruits may
have trained with Al Qaeda . . . . The American dream alone may not be enough to stop youngsters from being attracted into Al Qaeda’s ranks. British cases have shown that, as often as not,
it is university-educated, middle-class, Mercedes-driving youngsters that plot terrorist attacks.”
Id. See also Raffi Khatchadourian, Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown, New
Yorker, Jan. 22, 2007, at 50.
21.
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948c (2009) (“Any alien unprivileged enemy belligerent is subject to trial by
military commission as set forth in this chapter.”).
22.
See Glazier, supra note 10, at 156–58 (recording how Britain refuses to allow its citizens to be
tried in tribunals).
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This debate about whether Article III courts are indeed superior to
tribunals is quickly becoming moot. Proponents of Article III trials fatefully assumed that federal courts would adhere to procedural and constitutional guidelines unwaveringly, as opposed to the arbitrary and
subjective “kangaroo courts” of the tribunal system.23 If this assumption were true, Article III courts’ heavy terrorism caseload would seem
to signal victory for federal court proponents. But simply hearing a
large number of terror cases in federal courts was never meant to be an
end in itself: Article III terror trials were but a means to secure the constitutional protections that military tribunals lacked. If, in trying terrorists, Article III courts succumbed to the same pressures that crippled
tribunals, holding terror trials in federal courts would be no victory at
all.
In a trend that should alarm both tribunal proponents and detractors alike, these once-antagonistic systems are becoming twins. While
efforts to improve the military tribunal system to match constitutional
and international legal norms have enjoyed a fair level of success,24
long-entrenched Article III standards are deteriorating at a pace that
mirrors the pace of tribunals’ improvements. A cluster of recent cases,
proposed bills, and regulatory actions have narrowed the gap between
Article III courts and military tribunals considerably. When viewed as
a whole, these blurred lines between the military and domestic spheres
draw the federal courts into disquieting congruity with the tribunal
system. Specifically, these decisions and bills have altered (1) habeas
jurisprudence, (2) detention policy, and (3) criminal investigatory procedure in ways that suggest a disturbing trend. This trend suggests,
in turn, that so long as there remains a pressure to convict and permanently incapacitate alleged terrorists — or, to state the contrapositive,
so long as there exists trepidation about releasing alleged terrorists for
fear that they may be still dangerous — no court system will be immune
from the invariably pervasive effects of such pressure.

See, e.g., David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st-Century Military
Commission, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2005 (2003) (arguing that military tribunals may need additional due
process safeguards).
24.
See David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, New Rules on Terror Custody Being Drafted, L.A. Times,
Apr. 15, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama administration is for the first time drafting classified guidelines
to help the government determine whether newly captured terrorism suspects will be prosecuted
or held indefinitely without trial.”); see also Wiegmann & Martins, supra note 7, at 3 (“On May 15,
the Administration announced five rule changes . . . as a first step toward meaningful reform of
the commissions established by the MCA.”).
23.
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Wars have a corrosive effect on courts. Many of the darkest moments
in federal jurisprudential history have resulted from wartime cases.25
This is because, “[i]n an idealized view, our judicial system is insulated
from the ribald passions of politics. [But] in reality, those passions suffuse the criminal justice system.”26 Wars especially tend to excite passions to a fever pitch. As the D.C. Circuit has lamented,
[t]he common law process depends on incrementalism
and eventual correction, and it is most effective where
there are a significant number of cases brought before
a large set of courts, which in turn enjoy the luxury of
time to work the doctrine supple. None of those factors
exist in the Guantánamo context. . . . [I]n the midst of
an ongoing war, time to entertain a process of trial and
error is not a luxury we have.27
The war in Afghanistan, presenting a host of thorny legal issues,28
is now the longest war in United States history.29 This means that the
federal courts have never endured wartime conditions for so long. As a
result of this prolonged martial influence, it is clear that this war is corroding federal court jurisprudence. Court-watchers have long feared
the danger of “seepage” — the notion that, if terrorists were tried in
Article III courts, the pressure to convict would spur the creation of
bad law that would “seep” into future non-terror trials.30 In this Note,
I argue that this hypothetical fear of seepage has become concrete.
Indeed, judges already admit that the war has taken a regrettable toll
on courts’ opinions. In Al-Bihani v. Obama,31 a recent D.C. Circuit decision about Guantánamo detention, habeas corpus review, and criminal
procedure, the opinion’s author admits how the courts have bent to
accommodate the pressures of war:
See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (which upheld the jurisdiction of a United States military tribunal over the trial of several Operation Pastorius German saboteurs in the United States).
26.
David Feige, The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will Inevitably Create Bad Law, Slate
(Nov. 19, 2009),
27.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring).
28.
See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 881–82 (Brown, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he legal issues
presented by our nation’s fight with this enemy have been numerous, difficult, and to a large
extent novel. What drives these issues is the unconventional nature of our enemy: they are neither soldiers not mere criminals, claim no national affiliation, and adopt long-term strategies and
asymmetric tactics that exploit the rules of open societies without respect or reciprocity.”).
29.
See Rick Hampson, Afghanistan: America’s Longest War, USA Today, May 28, 2010, at A1.
30.
See, e.g., David Feige, The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will Inevitably Create Bad Law,
Slate (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.slate.com/ id/2236146 (“Ever deferential to the trial court, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit will affirm dozens of decisions that redact and restrict the disclosure of secret documents, prompting the government to be ever more expansive in
invoking claims of national security and emboldening other judges to withhold critical evidence
from future defendants.”).
31.
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866.
25.
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War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It
must recognize that the old wineskins of international
law, domestic criminal procedures, or other prior frameworks are ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new warfare. We can no longer afford diffidence. This war has
placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge
of a new and frightening paradigm, one that demands
new rules be written. Falling back on the comfort of
prior practices supplies only illusory comfort.32
In this Note, I argue that courts have already begun to heed Judge
Brown’s advice and are writing new rules in three key areas of criminal justice. More specifically, I contend that, as a result of a decade of
federal courts accommodating the government’s campaign against terror, the criminal justice system is beginning to resemble the very military tribunals that once were the antithesis of Article III courts. In Part
II, I discuss how the federal judiciary’s perspective on habeas corpus
review has shifted dramatically even since the beginning of the global
war on terror. In Part III, I argue that recent court decisions and administrative agency action have created an Article III-sanctioned indefinite
detention system that is almost indistinguishable from Guantánamo
Bay. In Part IV, I observe that courts have relaxed their threshold evidentiary requirements to a point that is strikingly similar to those of
military tribunals. In short, courts are becoming military commissions
that convict.
These developments should cause all sides to pause and reevaluate the ends they seek. The normative question about where terrorists
should be tried should only be answered after assessing what effects
those trials will have on the system in which they take place. For,
although terrorism caused the changes in the three areas that I highlight, these changes will have impacts that outlast and reach far beyond
the current era of terrorism.

II. Habeas Corpus and the Suspension Clause
Much of the federal courts’ terror jurisprudence from the past
decade focuses on the writ of habeas corpus. Prior to 9/11, issues surrounding false imprisonment and the death penalty largely shaped
habeas case law. Since 2001, however, the most seminal habeas cases
have dealt with terror and executive detention. This decade-long pressure on courts to conform habeas jurisprudence to the exigencies of
wartime has all but emasculated the Great Writ. Congress has twice
32.

Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring).
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attempted to strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction,33 and the Supreme
Court has twice rebuffed such attempts at categorical preclusion.34
Courts’ resistance to the Executive branch’s broad discretion in its
detention decisions has deteriorated. In fact, since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Boumediene, lower courts have distorted significantly both
who may invoke the writ and what procedures ensue if review is available.
Boumediene, and Hamdan and Rasul v. Bush35 before it, were factheavy opinions. But the principle underlying all three seemed clear: the
extraterritoriality of an inmate’s capture and detention does not foreclose habeas review. At oral argument in Boumediene, for example, the
government insisted that Eisentrager stood for the principle that habeas
corpus — and, with that, the privilege of regular criminal process — does
not extend to enemy aliens captured abroad and detained abroad.36 The
Court rejected this formalistic reading of Eisentrager as being at odds
with its historically more functional approach to habeas jurisdiction.37
Instead, the Court laid out a tripartite test for whether habeas review
would be available. Habeas review will depend upon “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through
which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the
writ.”38 In the case of the Boumediene petitioners, the Court found that
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005) (stating
that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider (1) an application for a
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
who (A) is currently in military custody; or (B) has been determined . . . to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant”). Later, in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006), which stated: “(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of
an alien detained by the United States who has been determined . . . to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. (2) [N]o court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an
alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined . . . to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” For an excellent discussion of Congress’s attempts to strip habeas jurisdiction from the federal courts, see Alexander,
supra note 6.
34.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
35.
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
36.
See Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34536, Boumediene v. Bush:
Guantánamo Detainees’ Right to Habeas Corpus 4 (2008). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950).
37.
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758–64; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (opining that the Constitution’s extraterritoriality is contingent upon “particular circumstances,” “practical necessities,” “possible alternatives which Congress before it,” and upon
whether doing so would be “impracticable and anomalous.”).
38.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
33.
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(1) the petitioners were non-citizen, enemy aliens subject to an inadequate determination process;39 (2) they were detained at a location —
Guantánamo Bay — subject to de facto United States sovereignty;40 and
(3) their habeas review would present no “threat” to the United States’
war efforts.41 Thus, the Court permitted habeas review.
Post-Boumediene, it was unclear to what extent lower courts would
extend its holding beyond its specific facts. But after a pair of recent
D.C. Circuit opinions, Al-Bihani v. Obama42 and Al Maqaleh v. Gates,43
it seems that Boumediene’s facts mark the outermost bounds of the
Suspension Clause’s reach. Indeed, post-Al-Bihani and -Al Maqaleh,
an enervated Suspension Clause will not extend beyond Guantánamo
Bay. This is especially important because both Al-Bihani and Al Maqaleh
garnered unanimous opinions from the D.C. Circuit.44 Given Justice
Stevens’ recent retirement, the Supreme Court is losing its Boumediene
architect. Moreover, Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Stevens’s replacement,
will likely need to recuse herself from reviewing both cases based on
her involvement with them while she served as solicitor general. Thus,
even if the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the most probable outcome would be a 4–4 affirmance of the D.C. Circuit. Al-Bihani and Al
Maqaleh will therefore stand as the most authoritative rulings on the
Suspension Clause for the foreseeable future.
In Al-Bihani, the petitioner was a Yemeni citizen imprisoned at
Guantánamo Bay since 2002. He contested the lawfulness of his detention and alleged substantial procedural defects with his prior habeas
review.45 The petitioner, Al-Bihani, claimed that the district court’s
habeas procedure was impermissible because (1) it adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard; (2) it shifted the burden to Al-Bihani
to disprove the lawfulness of his detention; (3) it did not hold a separate
evidentiary hearing; (4) it admitted hearsay evidence; (5) it presumed
the government’s evidence to be true; (6) it required Al-Bihani to prove
why his discovery request would not unduly burden the government;
and (7) it denied all of his discovery requests but one.46

Id.
Id. at 2262.
41.
Id. at 2261-62.
42.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
43.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
44.
The Al-Bihani opinion, written by Judge Brown, was joined by Judges Williams and Kavanaugh.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866. The Al Maqaleh opinion, written by Chief Judge Sentelle, was joined by
Judges Tatel and Edwards. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84.
45.
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869–70.
46.
Id. at 875–76.
39.
40.
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The D.C. Circuit, acknowledging the truthfulness of Al-Bihani’s
claims, cursorily cast aside his arguments: “Al-Bihani[] . . . clearly demonstrates error, but that error is his own.”47 Al-Bihani’s error, the court
explained, was assuming that criminal habeas precedent was applicable to detainee habeas cases. “Habeas review for Guantánamo detainees
need not match the procedures developed by Congress and the courts
specifically for habeas challenges to criminal convictions.”48 Instead, the
court continued, Boumediene “invited ‘innovation’ of habeas procedures
by lower courts, [and] grant[ed] leeway for ‘certain accommodations to
be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place
on the military.’”49 The court thus held that the long history of robust
protections in the criminal habeas sphere was wholly inapplicable to
Guantánamo detainees. Instead, the panel was free to “develop various procedures applicable to various circumstances of detention.”50 In
the “circumstance” of detainee detention, detainees may rely only on a
nascent, post-9/11 “branch” of habeas procedures that protect military
concerns more than individual rights.51 After setting up this toothless
habeas standard of review, the court excused each of the government’s
procedural missteps as “harmless error” not amounting to constitutionally impermissible behavior,52 a decision the court acknowledged
resulted from the war’s corrosive effect.53
After Al-Bihani announced a restrictive view of the procedural
protections afforded if habeas is available, the issue of when habeas is
available was ripe for review. In Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit was presented with three petitioners, citizens of Yemen and Tunisia, captured
in Pakistan and Thailand and later transported to the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan.54 The D.C. Circuit unanimously agreed that
the Suspension Clause’s protections did not extend to these petitioners.55 The government again argued for a strict reading of Eisentrager
and Boumediene, insisting that habeas corpus rights should extend
only to regions that “may be considered effectively part of the United
States.”56 Although the court explicitly rejected such a categorical rule,57
Id. at 876.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 876.
49.
Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008)).
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 877.
52.
Id. at 881 (“Even assuming error, the errors were harmless”).
53.
Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring) (“War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It must
recognize that the old wineskins of international law, domestic criminal procedures, or other prior
frameworks are ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new warfare. We can no longer afford diffidence. This war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written. Falling back on the comfort of prior
practices supplies only illusory comfort.”).
54.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
55.
Id. at 99.
56.
Id. at 94.
57.
See id.
47.
48.
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its application of Boumediene’s three-factor test makes uncertain precisely where else beyond Guantánamo the Suspension Clause could
possibly extend.
In its analysis of Boumediene’s first factor, which concerns the
petitioners’ citizenship, their status, and the adequacy of the process
leading to that determination, the court noted that the Al Maqaleh
petitioners’ citizenship and status “differ[ed] in no material respect
from the petitioners at Guantánamo who prevailed in Boumediene.”58
Moreover, because the Al Maqaleh petitioners’ status determination
process “afforded even less protection to the rights of detainees”59 than
did the process at issue in Boumediene, the court found that the first factor “even more strongly favors petitioners here.”60
The D.C. Circuit found the second factor — the nature of the sites
where apprehension and detention took place — to weigh “heavily in
favor of the United States.”61 First, the court quietly sidestepped the
all-important fact that none of the petitioners before it were captured
in or were citizens of Afghanistan by analogizing simply that, “[l]ike
all petitioners in both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the petitioners here
were apprehended abroad.”62 Second, the court held that the Bagram
facility is of an entirely different nature than Guantánamo Bay. Despite
both Bagram and Guantánamo Bay being subject to U.S. leaseholds,
the court claimed that the “surrounding circumstances” at Bagram are
“hardly the same.”63 The court distinguished the two sites using the
novel factors of the government’s intent for permanency and the formal
hostility of the “host” nation: “The United States manifested its intent
to remain in de facto control over Guantánamo Bay by having occupied
the base for “over a century . . . in the face of a hostile government
maintaining de jure sovereignty over the property.”64 In contrast, and in
spite of America’s indefinite leasehold over Bagram, the court posited
that “there is no indication of any intent to occupy the base with permanence, nor is there hostility on the part of the ‘host’ country.”65 Therefore,
the court concluded, any argument that the government exercises de
facto control over Bagram is simply not “realistic.”66
Id. at 96.
Id.
60.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 97.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. (emphasis added).
66.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Future Bagram litigants are even less likely
to overcome this standard in light of reports that the Obama Administration is planning to turn
over control over the Bagram facility to the Afghan government. See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Aims to
Share Afghan Prison, L.A. Times, Jun. 9, 2010, at A1. The United States, however, would “carve out
a section of the prisons for non-Afghan detainees who would remain under U.S. custody.”Id.
58.
59.
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In its treatment of the third factor, the court found Afghanistan’s status as an active war zone to pose “overwhelming” “practical obstacles”
to granting habeas review, despite having just found the lack of Afghan
“hostility” dispositive in its factor-two analysis.67 Unlike the prison at
Guantánamo Bay, the court argued, the Bagram facilities are “exposed
to the vagaries of war,”68 a situation that precludes habeas review. The
court rested this conclusion on dicta from Eisentrager69 that wartime
trials “hamper the war effort” because they result in the “effective fettering of a field commander . . . [by] allow[ing] the very enemies he is
ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive
abroad to the legal defensive at home.”70
Finally, the court dismissed the petitioners’ argument that this holding will allow the United States to “cho[o]se the place of detention and
. . . evade judicial review of Executive detention decisions by transferring detainees into active conflict zones, thereby granting the Executive
the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”71 While claiming
not to “ignore” this argument, the court stated that such a worry has
no application to factors two or three and thus would not change the
outcome of the case.72 The court, although noting that “such manipulation by the Executive might constitute an additional factor” to be considered, nonetheless concluded that no manipulation was at play in the
instant case.73
The D.C. Circuit’s holding in Al Maqaleh all but emasculates
Boumediene. Under the court’s factor-two analysis, the inverse relationship between the “host” and “guest” governments serves as a proxy
for intent. The more “hostile” the host government, the more likely it
is that a leaseholder truly intends to remain; and, as a result, the more
likely it is that the lessee exercises de facto sovereignty over the land.
But by focusing on the formal “peace” or “hostility” between two
nations, the court turns the unobjectionable logic of this argument on
its head. To declare that the otherwise-pacific base at Guantánamo persists in the face of “hostility,” as opposed to the tranquility in which
Id. (analogizing the security conditions at Bagram to those at issue in Eisentrager, where the
court found that security threats remained high even after the formal cessation of hostilities).
68.
Id. (distinguishing Boumediene in that no such exposure was apparent at Guantánamo).
69.
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (“The ancient rule against suits by resident
alien enemies has survived only so far as necessary to prevent use of the courts to accomplish
a purpose which might hamper our war efforts or give aid to the enemy.”) (quoting Ex parte
Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75 (1942)).
70.
Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779).
71.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing brief for appellees).
72.
Id. (finding such deliberate transportation of detainees into Bagram absent in this case without
further comment on the evidence, while reserving judgment on the weight such a fact would
carry if present).
73.
Id. at 99 (reaching its determination in part by reasoning that officials could not have anticipated Boumediene when selecting Bagram over a location outside the theater of war).
67.
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the Bagram facility sits, belies the actual nature of the two sites and
stretches the definition of “hostility” far beyond its natural meaning.
This definition of hostility is still more implausible when coupled with
the court’s third-factor analysis. Although Afghanistan’s status as an
active warzone has no bearing on whether the site is “hostile,” it holds
dispositive weight for factor three. The court’s second- and third-factor
analyses together pack a powerful one-two punch: habeas review is
unavailable in nations (a) with which the United States is formally at
peace and (b) in which the United States has military forces subject
to the “vagaries” of war. Ironically, this logic applies neatly to Cuba’s
nearest neighbor, Haiti. Despite being at peace with Haiti, America has
maintained a military presence there since 2004, and its troops have
been subject to occasional violent attacks.74 After Al Maqaleh, a prisoner
detained at a hypothetical American facility in Haiti arguably would
have less right to habeas protections than his counterparts incarcerated
at Guantánamo, mere miles away across a Caribbean channel.
Such distinctions based on formal “hostility” underscore how much
the war on terror has eroded federal court habeas jurisprudence since
9/11. Since the Guantánamo inmate population is expected to dwindle,75
the import of a decision limiting extraterritorial habeas review to just
Guantánamo Bay cannot be overstated. For example, the D.C. Circuit
relies heavily upon the Eisentrager Court’s fear that “calling commanders to account” for habeas review would disturb the war effort.76 Yet,
the majority opinion never explains how granting habeas review for
prisoners in Afghanistan differs in any meaningful way from doing so
for prisoners at Guantánamo Bay: in both circumstances, the same officer would need to appear at the same type of proceeding in the same
venue, with the only difference being the location of the prisoner at
issue. Finally, the petitioners’ argument that the Executive may now
capture prisoners anywhere and then detain them beyond reach of the
Constitution is highly salient.77 However, the court gives it superficial
See United Nations, UN Mission’s Contributions by Country 7 (Feb. 28, 2009), http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2009/ feb09_5.pdf (identifying the number of
United States troops and police active in the international mission in Haiti). See also U.N. S.C.
Rep. of the Security Council, Apr. 13–16, 2005, ¶17, U.N. Doc. S/2005/302 (May 6, 2005) (detailing
the combat deaths of several members of the United Nations mission in Haiti). See generally U.N.
Dep’t of Pub. Info., Stabilization Mission in Haiti: Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/
en/ peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml (2010) (providing references to Security
Council resolutions authorizing the mission in Haiti since 2004, along with lists of contributing
countries, total deployment strength, and mission fatalities).
75.
See Cloud & Barnes, supra note 13 (reporting that no prisoners have been sent to Guantánamo
under the Obama administration).
76.
Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98 (finding the arguments against allowing the Eisentrager prisoners access to civil courts even more persuasive when applied to Bagram) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 776, 779 (1950)).
77.
See id. (“[W]ithout dismissing the legitimacy or sincerity of appellees’ concerns [regarding the
government’s possible ability to transfer detainees to avoid constitutional protections], we doubt
that this fact goes to either the second or third of the Supreme Court’s enumerated factors.”).
74.
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treatment, noting only that a showing in some future case of governmental intent to circumvent habeas review might change its analysis. It
is far from certain, however, what showing would be needed to trigger
this exception. For neither Congress’s attempts to strip federal habeas
jurisdiction nor a White House official’s admission that the prison at
Bagram is being expanded, in part, because the United States “has few
other places to hold and interrogate foreign prisoners without giving
them access to the U.S. court system,”78 demonstrate the requisite governmental intent to circumvent the judiciary.
Al Maqaleh’s reasoning is expansive enough to preclude from habeas
protections all future detainees except for those at Guantánamo, and
Al-Bihani ensures that even those who get habeas review will find the
Great Writ to offer less-than-great protection. Together, these two “wartime” decisions distort habeas into something much weaker than its
pre-9/11, or even pre-Boumediene, analogue. Indeed, in Boumediene, the
Supreme Court declared “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to
survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled, and in our system they are reconciled within the
framework of the law.”79 Yet less than two years after that statement,
Al-Bihani’s bold pronouncement that “[w]ar is a challenge to law, and
the law must adjust,”80 indicates a frightening new chapter in wartime
habeas jurisprudence.

III. Military Detention and Criminal Incarceration
Detention has long been one of the most contentious issues in the
war on terror.81 The Executive’s claimed ability to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely has been controversial, but is technically permitted
under a Congressional mandate granting the President broad detention power.82 Many detainees have languished for over eight years in
facilities at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere, often without charges or
a chance to contest the facts leading to their detention.83 Despite initial
Cloud & Barnes, supra note 13.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
80.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 509 F.3d 866, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring).
81.
See, e.g., Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 Tex.
Int’l L.J. 1 (2007); Glazier, supra note 10.
82.
See Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (“The federal courts have confirmed our legal authority to detain in the Guantanamo habeas cases, but the Administration is not asserting an
unlimited detention authority. For example, with regard to individuals detained at Guantánamo
. . . we are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute — the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) — as informed by the principles of the laws of war. Our detention
authority in Afghanistan comes from the same source.”); see also Authorization for Use of Military
Force, S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
83.
See Marc Ambinder, Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, Atlantic (May 14, 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 10/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-at78.
79.
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cues to the contrary,84 the Obama Administration is weighing a major
expansion of its military detention program that would involve a permanent prison facility at the United States Air Force Base in Bagram,
Afghanistan, where about 800 terror suspects currently await charges.85
Detainees appear to have lost in their struggle to apply international legal norms — which would otherwise mandate their release
at a conflict’s conclusion86 — to the United States’ military detention
bagram/56678 (“The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) runs a classified interrogation facility for
high-value detainees inside Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan, defense and administration officials
said, and prisoners there are sometimes subject to tougher interrogation methods than those used
elsewhere.”); Hilary Andersson, Red Cross Confirms ‘Second Jail’ at Bagram, Afghanistan, BBC News
(May 11, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8674179.stm (noting the existence of
separate, distinct, and until recently, secret holding facility at the Bagram Air Force Base).
84.
See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (ordering the closure of the
Guantánamo Bay Detention Center by Jan. 22, 2010). Nevertheless, The White House lawyer who originally led the efforts to end Guantánamo’s role as a detention and tribunal center, Daniel J. Meltzer, resigned in early May. See also Charlie Savage, White House Deputy
Counsel Resigns, Caucus (May 7, 2010), http://thecaucus.blogs. nytimes.com/ 2010/05/07/
white-house-deputy-counsel-resigns.
85.
See Cloud & Barnes, supra, note 13. See also Ambinder, supra note 83; Andersson, supra note
83. This expansion is especially worrisome given recent allegations from Bush Administration
defense officials that many Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib inmates were wrongfully detained
and are, in fact, innocent. See Sworn Declaration of Col. Lawrence B. Wilkerson at 5, Hamad v.
Bush, CV 05-1009 JDB (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) (“It was . . . clear that many of the men were innocent,
or at a minimum their guilt was impossible to determine let alone prove in any court of law, civilian or military.”); Id. at 8 (“[M]y investigation into the Abu Ghraib detentions revealed that some
50–60% of those imprisoned in Abu Ghraib were probably innocent.”). Wilkerson’s declaration in
support of Adel Hassan Hamad’s civil suit marks the first time a Bush Administration official has,
under oath, proclaimed the innocence and wrongful detention of a Guantánamo detainee. In his
declaration, Wilkerson makes a range of allegations regarding Hamad’s innocence in particular
as well as the failures of the military detention system in general: “With respect to the assertions
by Mr. Hamad that he was wrongfully seized and detained, it became apparent to me as early
as August 2002, and probably earlier to other State Department personnel who were focused on
these issues, that many of the prisoners detained at Guantánamo had been taken into custody
without regard to whether they were truly enemy combatants, or in fact whether many of them
were enemies at all. I soon realized from my conversations with military colleagues as well as
foreign service officers in the field that many of the detainees were, in fact, victims of incompetent
battlefield vetting.” Id. at 4.
86.
See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135) (“Prisoners of war shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); see also Hague Convention on
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1817 (requiring repatriation after
“conclusion of peace”); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2301 (also requiring repatriation “[a]fter the conclusion of peace”);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 75, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2055 (noting that repatriation should be accomplished “with the least possible delay after conclusion of peace”); Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained
without Trial, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 503, 510-511 (2003) (noting that prisoners of war “can be detained
during an armed conflict, but the detaining country must release and repatriate them ‘without delay after the cessation of active hostilities,’ unless they are being lawfully prosecuted or have been
lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving sentences.”) (citing Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 85, 99, 118, 119, 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135.).
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scheme. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld made clear that America’s military engagement justifying detention could last indefinitely87 and, even if the war
ended, Al-Bihani v. Obama introduced the principle that detention may
outlast the end of an engagement.88
Article III trials, therefore, seem to offer the greatest protection
against arbitrary and indefinite detention. Regardless what process the
courts followed, alleged terrorists would still receive a sentence matching the crime for which they were convicted. But a recent Supreme
Court decision and a proposed rule from the Bureau of Prisons cast
doubt on whether Article III trials — and, more importantly, Article III
sentences — will continue to protect against indefinite detention.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Comstock sets a disturbing precedent for terrorist-detainees.89 Comstock involved sentencing issues for sex offenders, a topic seemingly unrelated to terrorism.
Yet the Court held that Congress may use its Necessary and Proper
Clause powers to permanently detain dangerous sex offenders if they
appear to pose a threat to the surrounding community upon release.90
That Congress may order the civil commitment of dangerous prisoners after completing their sentences sets the stage for transplanting an
indefinite detention regime into the criminal sphere. The possibility
that this reasoning would or could be extended to cover terrorists subject to Article III criminal sentencing is far from remote. Indeed, many
commentators noticed instantly Comstock’s potential impact on terrorconnected inmates.91
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (“If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that [a detainee]
might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken
throughout the litigation of this case suggests that [his] detention could last for the rest of his
life.”). The “end of an engagement” is dependent on a political determination that could come
long after the actual violence in which the combatant was involved ends.
88.
Indeed, in Al-Bihani, the court relied on the petitioner’s avowed quasi-military service as a justification for his detention but paradoxically disregarded such status with respect to Al-Bihani’s
request for release. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872-74. The court notes that there are currently
enough U.S. troops in Afghanistan to consider it an ongoing conflict that justifies continued detention, which implies that the eventual U.S. exit from Afghanistan would trigger the release of those
held in military detention according to international norms. Id. at 874. But the court confronts the
specter of a future release directly — and depressingly. According to the court, releasing Al-Bihani
at the end of hostilities “would make each successful campaign of a long war but a Pyrrhic prelude to defeat. The initial success of the United States . . . in ousting the Taliban from the seat of
government and establishing a young democracy would trigger an obligation to release Taliban
fighters captured in earlier clashes. Thus, the victors would be commanded to constantly refresh
the ranks of the fledgling democracy’s most likely saboteurs.” Id.
89.
See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
90.
See id. at 1965 (holding that the statute in question “is a ‘necessary and proper’ means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their
violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain
the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others.”).
91.
See, e.g., Lauren M. Kulpa, Comment, U.S. v. Comstock, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011)
(noting prominent criticisms regarding Comstock’s potential impact in terror-related incarcera87.
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The statute at issue in Comstock authorizes a court to civilly commit a soon-to-be-released prisoner if he (1) previously “engaged or
attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation,”
(2) “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” and
(3) as a result of the disorder, remains “sexually dangerous to others”
such that “he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually
violent conduct or child molestation if released.”92 If a court finds all
of these factors, it may commit the prisoner to the Attorney General’s
custody, who must make “all reasonable efforts” to return the prisoner
to the state in which he was tried or in which he is domiciled.93 If the
Attorney General is unsuccessful in this endeavor, the prisoner is sent
to a federal treatment facility and remains there until he is no longer
dangerous.94
By its terms, this statute applies to sex criminals, not terrorists.
Nevertheless, this opinion, which garnered the support of seven justices, clears away any foreseeable barriers to Congress issuing a similar statute aimed at terrorists. After Comstock, Congress may authorize
the Attorney General to detain “dangerous” criminals in perpetuity
after the termination of their sentences under its Necessary and Proper
Clause powers. A statute codifying that notion would alter terrorism
prosecutions radically.
Of all terrorism-related indictments between 2001 and 2009, 478
have resulted in criminal sentences.95 Of those, a plurality of 220 led to
a sentence of less than one year, and an additional 134 led to a sentence
of between one and five years.96 A mere twenty-six convictions have
led to a sentence of thirty or more years.97 Thus, 74% of terror prosecutions result in the defendant serving less than five years in prison. This
relatively light sentencing is a byproduct of the difficulty of proving
in court some of the government’s more serious allegations, like those
falling under the “Terrorism” chapter of the U.S. Code.98 As a result,
only 29.5% of suspected terrorists’ indictments even included a charge
under a “terrorism” statute.99 Many suspected terrorists instead have
tion); Dahlia Lithwick, Detention Slip, Slate (May 18, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2254223
(“[T]he more worrisome question is whether this very expansive view of federal crime-fighting
authority would carry over to terrorism suspects whom the government may want to detain without trial.”).
92.
18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5)-(6) (2006). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (authorizing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons according to the definitions set forth in § 4247).
93.
See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)).
94.
18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
95.
Center on Law & Sec., New York Univ. Sch. of Law, Highlights from the Terrorist Trial
Report Card 2001–2009: Lessons Learned 11 (2009).
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006).
99.
Highlights from the Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 95.
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been charged with immigration and weapons violations, resulting in
significantly lesser penalties.100
The obvious and ominous portent of the Comstock decision is that
the government may obtain a conviction for a suspected terrorist on a
relatively minor charge carrying a light sentence and then, after the conclusion of the sentence, declare the prisoner to be “dangerous” and thus
subject to indefinite detention. Indeed, Obama Administration officials
have admitted that part of the government’s unwillingness to release
Guantánamo inmates to criminal authorities is driven by the perceived
difficulty the government will have in obtaining an adequately long
sentence for “known” terrorists if sufficient evidence is lacking.101 If a
conviction for a lesser crime could be obtained, Comstock’s logic would
offer an attractive avenue for closing Guantánamo while detaining its
former inmates indefinitely.
It is not hard to imagine a slightly altered version of the statute
at issue in Comstock applying in a terrorism context. Congress could
tweak the Comstock statute to allow indefinite detention based on a
finding that a prisoner (1) previously “engaged or attempted to engage
in [terrorism-related] violent conduct,” (2) remains committed to his
terrorist cause, and (3) as a result of his terrorism connections, remains
“dangerous to others” such that “he would have serious difficulty in
refraining from [terrorist or] violent conduct if released.” In essence,
Comstock permits the Executive to entertain the notion: “once a danger
to children, always a danger to children.” This, in itself, is troubling.
The more troubling analogue, though, is “once a terrorist, always a
terrorist,” which seems a likely conclusion given predictions that Al
Qaeda will never cease to exist.102 If Al Qaeda or its analogues are still
operational upon a prisoner’s scheduled release, it is difficult to see
Id.
See generally Peter Finn, Panel on Guantanamo backs indefinite detention for some, Wash. Post,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (noting that detainees can challenge evidence which may compromise
intelligence-gathering).
102.
Present understandings of Al Qaeda suggest that its organizational structure makes its extermination an unachievable goal. Indeed, “Al Qaeda is a phenomenon that defies scorecard evaluations. . . . [Y]ou never know how close you are to reaching an objective.” Michael Brenner,
Al-Qaeda On the Ropes?, Huffington Post (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost .com/
michael-brenner/al-qaeda-on-the-ropes_b_552324.html. Brenner’s take on Al-Qaeda suggests
that Al-Qaeda is more an idea than an entity, making the notion of defeating it all-but-impossible:
“Using a proper noun, our minds instinctively conjure the image of an entity of well defined contours and dimension . . . . [But the] phenomenon we call al-Qaeda is amorphous, diffuse and in a
continual state of flux. This is especially true after 9/11 and during its years of duress. The exact
links between al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and “headquarters” in AfPak are obscure even to official
Washington. . . . “Al-Qaeda” is not the counterpart to the numerous nationalist movements we
have known. It is not geo-politically focused on a specific plot of ground; its aims are changeable
. . . . al-Qaeda in AfPak, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Arabia,
al-Qaeda in East Africa are all linked in various ways with other outfits . . . . Hence, each al-Qaeda
unit’s capability, tactics and orientation are partially a function of those shifting ties and the fortunes of their associates. Those associates, in turn, are even more diffuse than is the local al-Qaeda
itself.” Id.
100.
101.
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how a terrorist could ever overcome the Government’s assertions of
“dangerousness.” Regardless of whether this is a wise step, it is a significant departure from our standard approach to prison sentences.
A recent proposed rule by the Bureau of Prisons, which will alter
the criminal detention landscape dramatically, draws Comstock’s potential impact into sharp relief.103 In December 2006, the Bureau of Prisons
created the first of two “Communication Management Units” (CMU)
in Terra Haute, Indiana.104 Another CMU followed in March 2008, in
Marion, Illinois.105 According to a Bureau of Prisons spokesperson at
the time, the CMUs were “established to house inmates who, due to
their current offense of conviction, offense conduct, or other verified
information, require increased monitoring of communications between
the inmate and persons in the community in order to protect the safety,
security and orderly operation of Bureau facilities, and to protect the
public.”106 Despite this innocuous description, the two CMUs drew
immense criticism.107 Dubbed “Little Guantánamos” for the austere conditions imposed on inmates, CMUs were separate areas of the prison
into which the government placed mostly Arab Muslims suspected of
having terrorist ties.108 Once there, the CMU inmates’ communications
with the outside world was limited severely.109 This allowed prison
wardens at the two CMUs to ghettoize suspected terrorists and monitor their restricted communications.110
Because of the significant opposition to these CMUs, their implementation remained limited to the two facilities at Marion and Terra
Haute and it seemed that the CMU “experiment” would be phased
out.111 Instead, the new proposed rule codifies the current CMU scheme
of segregated detention and permits federal prisons throughout the
United States to institute their own CMUs. Citing the need to protect
against the danger of coded messages sent by prisoners,112 the rule
increases the already draconian limitations on CMU inmates’ contact
Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,324, 17,327–29 (proposed Apr.6, 2010) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540(j)).
104.
See Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,324.
105.
Id.
106.
Dean Kuipers, Isolation prisons under fire, L.A. Times, Jun. 18, 2009, at A11.
107.
See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Facility Holding Terrorism Inmates Limits Communication, Wash. Post, Feb.
25, 2007, at A7; Daniel McGowan, Tales from Inside the U.S. Gitmo, Huffington Post (Jun. 8, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-mcgowan/tales-from-inside-the-us_b_212632.html.
108.
See Eggen, supra note 107.
109.
See McGowan, supra note 107 (revealing that CMU inmate communication with family and attorneys outside the prison was nearly impossible).
110.
Indeed, the Bureau of Prisons has stated that CMU “will not be limited to inmates convicted of
terrorism-related cases, though all of the prisoners fit that description.” McGowan, supra note 107.
111.
See Eggen, supra note 107.
112.
See Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,324, 17,326 (proposed Apr. 6, 2010) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540(j)). See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987) (noting danger
of coded prison messages); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (same);
United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
103.
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with persons within and without the prison: communication would
be limited to a maximum of three pieces of double-sided paper, sent
and received once per week, to and from a single recipient,113 a limit the
prison warden may reduce as he deems “necessary.”114
More troubling than severity conditions within a CMU is the
ease with which the government may channel inmates into one. The
rule gives expansive discretion to prison wardens for deciding whom
to place within a CMU.115 According to the Bureau of Prisons:
Inmates may be designated to a CMU if evidence of the
following criteria exists:
(a) The inmate’s current offense(s) of conviction,
or offense conduct, included association, communication, or involvement, related to international or
domestic terrorism; [or]
(b) The inmate’s current offense(s) of conviction,
or offense conduct, or activity while incarcerated,
indicates a propensity to encourage, coordinate,
facilitate, or otherwise act in furtherance of, illegal
activity through communication with persons in
the community . . . .116
These provisions apply to any inmate even tenuously connected to terrorism, since the criteria demand merely that evidence of a terrorism
connection exist to justify CMU detention.117 And, despite the rule’s
stated purpose of preventing all forms of dangerous communication from all groups of prisoners, the short history of CMUs thus far
has demonstrated that the majority of its inmates are Arab Muslims
charged with or suspected of having terrorist ties.118
See Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,328.
See id.
115.
Id. This decision must be based on a review of the evidence and a conclusion that the inmate’s
designation to a CMU “is necessary to ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of correctional facilities, or protect the public.” Id.
116.
Id. The rule goes on to include prisoners who, because of a demonstrated propensity to communicate with either coconspirators or victims of their crimes, may also be placed in a CMU. Id.
(allowing CMU detention of inmates who have demonstrated a propensity to contact the victims
of the inmate’s current offense of conviction).
117.
By creating a subclass of prisoners based on ties to a charge of “terrorism,” which encompasses
myriad criminal statutes, the Bureau may unwittingly group together prisoners ranging from Al
Qaeda operatives to disgruntled domestic bombmakers. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006) (defining “weapons of mass destruction” in part as “destructive devices”, which includes any type of
bomb, grenade, mine or “projectile device” with a wide barrel. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006)). This flexible statute has been used to convict terrorists like Zacharias Moussaoui, Richard Reid, and Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab alongside a disgruntled Arkansas doctor and, recently, members of the
Hutaree Milita.
118.
See McGowan, supra note 107. See Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,328
(requiring demonstrated attempt to make an impermissible contact while also allowing CMU
designation based solely on conviction offense).
113.
114.
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The combination of Comstock and the CMU regulations resembles a
legally sanctioned Guantánamo-type detention regime set up lawfully
within the United States. Suspected terrorists can be held in highly
monitored and austere containment, indefinitely. This not only mirrors
the military tribunal detention system, but in many ways, exacerbates
its perceived infirmities. For, although the Obama Administration
has acknowledged that it will indefinitely detain some terrorists even
after they complete their tribunal-imposed sentences,119 the range of
those persons implicated by military tribunals is much smaller than
the reach of Comstock and the CMU regulations.120 The Government
has conceded that the Authorization for Use of Military Force permits Executive detention only of non-citizen enemy combatants and
unprivileged belligerents.121 Thus, the biggest single exception to the
Executive’s broad military detention authority had been American citizens, precluded from military commission jurisdiction.122 Diplomatic
concerns had further barred full tribunal trials for British, Australian,
and Canadian citizens.123 Since a growing number of recent terror suspects have been American or British,124 it appeared that indefinite and
segregated Executive detention would have limited future application. But neither Comstock nor the CMU regulation is so limited: both
would apply fully to American and foreign citizens alike. And because
a criminal’s offense conduct, which cannot be changed, serves as the
underlying justification for Comstock and CMU detention, both have
the capacity to last indefinitely.125
See Charlie Savage, Detainees Will Still Be Held, but not Not Tried, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2010, at A14
(noting that fifty detainees are “are too difficult to prosecute but too dangerous to release”).
120.
Commissions’ “jurisdiction [are] substantially narrower than our federal courts: they are properly used only in connection with an armed conflict, and only to prosecute offenses against the
law of war committed in the course of that conflict.” Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann & Mark
Martins, supra note 7. See al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 230 (Motz, J. concurring) (“Quirin, Hamdi, and Padilla
all emphasize that Milligan’s teaching — that our Constitution does not permit the Government to
subject civilians within the United States to military jurisdiction — remains good law.”).
121.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
see also al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 237 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J. concurring) (noting the
Government’s concession of this point at oral argument); Koh, supra note 82 (“[I]ndividuals who
are part of an organized armed group like al-Qaeda can be subject to law of war detention for
the duration of the current conflict. [This includes] whether an individual joined with or became
part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated forces, which can be demonstrated by relevant
evidence of formal or functional membership, which may include an oath of loyalty, training with
al-Qaeda, or taking positions with enemy forces.”).
122.
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948c (2009) (limiting jurisdiction to “alien[s]”).
123.
See Glazier, supra note 10 (noting that British pressure led to the release of several Brits set for
trial in a commission); id. at 179–181 (noting the Australian government’s role in securing a generous plea agreement for David Hicks).
124.
See Cruickshank, supra note 20.
125.
This is made especially difficult by the difficulty of distinguishing between Al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations. See Byman, supra note 19. Byman argues that “what makes al-Qaida so
distinct and so dangerous is that it tries to knit [many] different strands together. It backs local
causes and, as it does so, it urges the groups to expand their horizons to embrace al-Qaida’s global
agenda. At times, some of these local groups, such as al-Qaida of Iraq or al-Qaida of the Islamic
119.
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IV. Criminal Procedure
Finally, terror suspects’ rights before and during Article III trials
similarly are deteriorating to the level of protections afforded in military tribunals. The past decade has seen a slow degeneration in several
key areas of criminal procedural protections. Among the many adjustments Article III courts have made to accommodate the often unorthodox manner in which terror suspects reach the court, of particular note
are changes in Miranda protections and pre-trial evidence standards.
Miranda rights, perhaps the most familiar and well-known staple of
criminal procedure, recently have come under heavy assault. A series
of bills proposed by Congress and a decision handed down by the
Supreme Court make Miranda’s continued viability dubious, at best.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s review of a recent terror trial highlights some of the more unorthodox measures Article III courts have
adopted in response to terror trials.
A. Miranda Protections
On May 1, 2010, New York police officers foiled a much-publicized
attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square.126 Within hours, police
had apprehended and charged Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistan native and
United States citizen purportedly working for the Pakistani Taliban.127
Maghreb, have formally joined al-Qaida; at times cells or individuals tied to groups with a local
focus have switched allegiance to the al-Qaida core or provided logistical support or manpower
for an al-Qaida attack. And some shift over time: Egypt’s Islamic Jihad at first focused on the
Mubarak regime, but eventually part of the organization split and became the core of al-Qaida.
Making this even more complex, after area regimes crushed Egypt’s Jamaat al-Islamiyya and the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, some individuals from these organizations simply switched allegiances to al-Qaida and adopted its global orientation. Id. Furthermore, membership in Al Qaeda
does not necessarily equate with actual dangerousness. See Del Quentin Wilber, U.S. Can Continue
to Detain Yemeni, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2009 at A12 (“Musa’ab Al-Madhwani has been held at the
facility since October 2002 on allegations that he was a member of al-Qaeda. Ruling from the
bench, U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan said that the government had met its burden in proving the accusations but that he did not think Madhwani was dangerous. ‘There is nothing in the
record now that he poses any greater threat than those detainees who have already been released,’
the judge said, noting that Madhwani has been a model prisoner over the past seven years.”).
126.
See, e.g., Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Car Bomb Leads to Evacuation in Times Square, N.Y.
Times, May 2, 2010, at A1.
127.
Specifically, Shahzad is believed to be connected with either Jaish-e-Mohammed, “an Al
Qaeda-allied Pakistani militant group,” or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, another al-Qaeda-allied
Pakistani militant group. Alex Rodriguez, Bomb Plot Linked to Militants, L.A. Times, May 6, 2010, at
A18. See Bobby Ghosh, From Pakistan to the World, Time, May 17, 2010, at 25, 26–27. Initial theories
about who might have engineered the attack abounded, and included conjectures ranging from a
group of Al-Qaeda operatives to a “homegrown . . . mentally deranged person or somebody with
a political agenda that doesn’t like the [recently passed] healthcare bill or something.” Interview
by Katie Couric with Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, New York City, CBS Evening News with Katie
Couric (CBS television broadcast May 3, 2010) (on file with Brief). See also Sean Gardiner & Sumathi
Reddi, Bomb Was Crude but Lethal, Wall St. J., May 3, 2010, http://online/wsj.com/ article/SB10
001424052748704608104575220623841113164.html (“[It was] most likely the work of an American
or expatriate living in America that is not a trained member of a terrorist organization.”).
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In a particularly provocative response to this episode, Senator Joe
Lieberman proposed legislation that would strip terror suspects of U.S.
citizenship in order to avoid reading them Miranda rights.128 The proposed bill, called the Terrorist Expatriation Act, would modify existing
provisions for revoking U.S. citizenship by adding “providing material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” to the list of
citizenship-stripping triggers.129
As a response to the perceived danger of having to read Miranda
warnings to Shahzad, the bill suffers from three glaring errors. First,
Miranda imposes an affirmative duty upon law enforcement officers; it
does not grant any new rights to suspects.130 A suspect’s status or classification thus would have no impact on an arresting officer’s duties.
Second, law enforcement officers issue Miranda warnings at the outset
of an arrest, long before the officer would have a chance to determine
whether the suspect had “provid[ed] material support or resources to
a foreign terrorist organization,”131 and before the process required to
strip someone of his citizenship.132 Third, even if the arresting agent
could discern a suspect’s status, the proposed bill can only revoke citizenship after a suspect has been convicted of material support, seemingly undermining the entire purpose for the bill.133
Lieberman’s fear of Miranda rights, as expressed through his proposed bill, would likely create more problems than it purports to solve.134
See Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 111th Cong. (2010). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Edward Mason, Brown, Lieberman Bill Would Strip Citizenship of Terror Suspects,
Bos. Herald, May 6, 2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/us_politics/view.bg?articleid=
1252976 (noting initial support for the bill); Sam Stein, Lieberman’s Citizenship-Revoking Bill Slammed
as “Draconian”, Huffington Post (May 5, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/05/
liebermans-citizenship-re_n_564981.html (criticizing the bill’s paradoxical proposals).
129.
H.R. 5237 § 2(1)(C); see 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
130.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69. As Chief Justice Warren explained, “[S]uch a warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. . . . The Fifth
Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of
giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his
age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation;
a warning is a clear cut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated,
a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure
that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.” Id. See also Sol
Wachtler, You Have the Right to Remain Constitutional, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2010, at A31 (“[C]ontrary
to common belief, the Miranda warning doesn’t confer rights; it simply reminds arrestees of the
rights already granted to them by the Constitution.”).
131.
H.R. 5237 § 2(1)(C).
132.
See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that a U.S. citizen cannot be deprived of
citizenship involuntarily).
133.
H.R. 5237.
134.
See Stein, supra note 128 (“Indeed, what Lieberman is attempting to do is to pave the way
for terrorists with American citizenship to be thrown into military tribunals once they are captured.”). This suggestion seems especially likely given the Supreme Court’s approval of a “public
safety” exception to Miranda if law enforcement officials feel compelled to elicit time-sensitive
information from a suspect immediately upon capture. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
128.
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As increasing numbers of would-be terrorists reveal themselves to be
American citizens,135 this bill attempts to remedy the Miranda “problem” by abandoning the criminal justice system altogether and by trying all terrorists in military tribunals.136 In fact, Congress has proposed
ten bills to strengthen military tribunals during the 111th Congress
alone. Three bills would mandate military commission trials for certain suspected classes of terrorists.137 One proposal would bar any proceeding, including a military tribunal, from taking place on American
soil (thereby foreclosing Article III review and ensuring a tribunal at
Guantánamo).138 Three bills would strip the Department of Justice’s
funding and permission to prosecute terrorists in Article III courts,
and a fourth, in a similar vein, would require the President to secure
approval from the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security before
prosecuting a terrorist for a crime in an Article III court.139 A final bill
purports to give the President unilateral authority to determine which
detainees were subject to trial by tribunal.140
Neither courts nor the White House could ignore these proposals
to strip Article III courts of jurisdiction and funding. In response to
these proposals, the White House agreed to work on legislation that
would relax Miranda requirements, a position diametrically opposed to
the one it announced in the immediate aftermath of the Times Square
(1984). This exception was invoked with Shahzad as well as with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
the so-called Christmas Day Bomber. See Emily Bazelon, Miranda Worked! The Bizarre Criticism of
the Faisal Shahzad Interrogation, Slate (May 5, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2253056.
135.
See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 127 (listing thirteen U.S. citizen terrorists, all with ties to Pakistan).
136.
See Stein, supra note 128.
137.
See H.R. 4127, 111th Cong. (2009) (“[A]lien unprivileged enemy belligerents may only be tried
by military commissions if tried for alleged conduct for which a term of incarceration or the death
penalty may be sought.”); H.R. 4463, 111th Cong. (2010) (requiring “foreign national[s]” who “engage . . . in conduct constituting an offense relating to a terrorist attack against persons or property
in the United States or against any United States Government property or personnel outside the
United States; and [are] subject to trial for that offense by a military commission . . . be tried for
that offense only by a military commission . . . .”); H.R. 4588, 111th Cong. (2010) (maintaining
Guantánamo’s existence as a detention center indefinitely and mandating that persons held there
be tried only by military commission).
138.
See H.R. 4738, 111th Cong. (2010) (prohibiting the use of Department of Defense installations in
the United States for the prosecution of persons charged with crimes related to the September 11
attacks).
139.
See H.R. 4111, 111th Cong. (2009) (prohibiting the Department of Justice from prosecuting any
“unprivileged enemy combatant”); S. 2977, 111th Cong. (2010) (withdrawing Department of
Justice funding for any prosecution in an Article III court of persons involved in the September
11 attacks); H.R. 4556, 111th Cong. (2010) (same); Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and
Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 3081, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2010) (withdrawing Department of Justice
funding for any prosecution in an Article III court of aliens determined to be an unprivileged
enemy belligerent); S. 2943, 111th Cong. (2010) (requiring the Attorney General to consult with
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence before
prosecuting a terrorist in an Article III court).
140.
See H.R. 4415, 111th Cong. (2010) (granting the President the authority to determine which
persons are subject to detention or military commission trial as unlawful enemy combatants).
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incident.141 Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court also modified
its interpretation of Miranda protections in a way that may mollify
Congress but that comes at too great a cost.
In Berghuis v. Thompkins,142 the Supreme Court responded implicitly
to the loudest criticisms of the law enforcement response to the Times
Square bomber. In Berghuis, police questioned an unresponsive suspect
for three hours. After remaining silent during the investigators’ monologues, the suspect finally relented to the interrogation by answering
“yes” to a question about whether he prayed for forgiveness for the
crime.143 The 5–4 opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, paradoxically
concludes that Thompkins should have broken his silence if he wished
to invoke his right to silence.144 A suspect must thus speak to acknowledge his desire not to. The opinion goes on to establish that, if a suspect
has maintained silence for several hours and then speaks but does not
use that speech to declare his intent to stay silent, police may construe
that action as a waiver of the right to remain silent.145
As a threshold matter, it is unclear why so many are so concerned
about the “dangers” posed by protecting Miranda rights.146 Moreover,
although the Berghuis ruling does not specifically or especially impact
terror suspects, it reflects the public sentiment that Miranda warnings
are making America less safe. In the past months, all three branches
of the federal government have acted substantially to curb Miranda
rights: Congress and the White House, plainly responding to perceived
terror threats, acted first. The Supreme Court, although not explicit in
its rationale, followed suit. While it is far from dispositive proof that
Article III courts have begun responding to congressional pressure
Compare White House Press Briefing with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (C-SPAN television broadcast May 6, 2010) (noting that Lieberman’s proposal lacked any support within the White House),
with Pete Yost, ‘Modifying’ Miranda Modifies the Political Debate, Huffington Post (May 20, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/20/modifying-miranda-rights_n_583000.html
(“Attorney General Eric Holder and the rest of the Obama administration are suddenly playing
offense, offering to work with Congress on a law that would let law enforcement delay constitutional Miranda warnings to terror suspects.”).
142.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010 S. Ct. WL 2160784 *1 (U.S. June 1, 2010).
143.
See id. at *1.
144.
See id.
145.
See id.
146.
See Wachtler, supra note 130 (“[M]any supporters of Miranda exclusions argue that the rule
hamstrings law enforcement. This is wrong.”). Judge Wachtler explains that “it’s important to
note how little most people understand what Miranda does and doesn’t mean. First and foremost,
the failure to give a Miranda warning does not result in a case being dismissed. It only results in
the inability of the police to use a confession and its fruits in evidence. Indeed, the overwhelming
majority of successful criminal prosecutions do not involve confessions. . . . [T]alk-show hosts and
television police dramas have led people to believe that before the police may interrogate or arrest
a suspect, the Miranda warning must be given. That just isn’t the case. Neither arrest alone nor
interrogation alone (if there has been no arrest) requires the warning to be given. Miranda applies
only to in-custody questioning; a statement made to the police by a suspect not in custody is not
subject to Miranda. Id.
141.
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regarding America’s counterterrorism efforts, Berghuis is, at the very
least, part of a larger trend which points toward the conclusion that
Article III courts are not immune to the corrosive effects of an ongoing
war against terrorism.
B. Tribunal Procedures in Federal Courts
The recent trial of Abu Ali highlights this trend of relaxing procedural standards in the face of terrorism. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a
United States citizen, was arrested in Saudi Arabia in early 2003 in connection with the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombing.147 Held by Saudi officials, Abu Ali claims to have been tortured, describing his experience
that month as “very intense.”148 Eventually, Abu Ali was transferred to
the United States for trial.149 Once in America, the government charged
Abu Ali with nine separate terror offenses.150
In bringing Abu Ali to trial, the government was faced with several
evidentiary and procedural challenges that led to a fairly unorthodox
trial. Specifically, the government sought (a) to tweak Abu Ali’s Miranda
rights; (b) to introduce deposition testimony of Saudi officials taken
outside of the defendant’s presence; and (c) to use classified information to convict Abu Ali that he would not be allowed to view. The circuit court on review, however, found these deviations from standard
procedure “harmless.”151 As Professor Vladeck has noted, these deviations “demonstrate[] the flexibility that federal courts can exercise in
these cases and the potential dangers lurking in the background for the
rights of defendants.”152
First, the government sought to marginalize Abu Ali’s objections
to the admission of interrogation testimony taken without his having been given Miranda warnings.153 When Abu Ali had initially been
captured and interrogated by Saudi law enforcement officials, FBI and
Secret Service agents were present for much of the interrogation and, at
times, crafted the questions they wanted the Saudis to ask of Abu Ali.154

See United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343-44 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also United States v.
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221-26 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1501 (2010).
148.
Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
149.
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 225.
150.
See Vladeck, supra note 147.
151.
See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 257.
152.
Vladeck, supra note 147.
153.
See Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 381–83.
154.
Id. at 349, 382 (noting that the Saudi interrogators asked six of the thirteen questions the FBI and
Secret Service agents sought Abuto be asked of Abu Ali).
147.
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Under what is known as the “joint venture” doctrine,155 a defendant’s
statements made during a foreign-agent-administered interrogation
must be suppressed if United States officials are involved in the questioning and did not give Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, the district
court held that the United States officials’ presence and assistance did
not constitute a “joint venture” requiring Miranda warnings, nor did
the Saudi interrogators act at the behest of the United States agents.156
The Fourth Circuit affirmed by noting that the American officials present did not intend to “evade” Miranda,157 echoing the Al Maqaleh court’s
conjectures about the government’s intentions.158 Thus, Abu Ali’s seemingly inadmissible statements made without Miranda warnings, under
the duress of torture, in the presence of American authorities, and in
response to American-authored questions were nevertheless allowed
into evidence.159
Second, the government attempted to overcome the requirements
of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which mandates
that a defendant who is “in custody” be present at a witness’s deposition.160 In Abu Ali’s case, the government sought to introduce deposition testimony of Saudi government officials sitting in Saudi Arabia
outside Abu Ali’s physical presence. As the Fourth Circuit reasoned,
getting the Saudi officials to America would be too difficult, and transporting Abu Ali to Saudi Arabia to be present at the deposition would
be “impractical.”161 As a novel solution, the district court judge directed
that two government attorneys and two of Abu Ali’s defense attorneys
attend the deposition in Saudi Arabia while Abu Ali remained in custody in America with another defense attorney.162 These two separate
camps were connected via video chat technology, allowing the Saudi
officials and Abu Ali to see and hear one another simultaneously.163
Finally, the judge watched from yet a third location to preside over the
depositions and rule on objections.164 The Fourth Circuit approved these
See e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2003) (mandating that a defendant’s
statements made during interrogation by foreign agents must be suppressed if United States officials are involved in the questioning).
156.
Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
157.
See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 230 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009).
158.
See discussion supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
159.
In fact, only one member of the Fourth Circuit panel took umbrage at this apparent circumvention of Miranda. See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 230–31 n.6 (explaining that Judge Motz would hold that
the interrogation was a joint venture). Judge Motz’s dissent, however, was purely theoretical: she
joined the court’s reasoning that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and dissented
solely on the issue of sentencing. Id. at 269.
160.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(1).
161.
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 239.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 239–40.
155.
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unorthodox deposition procedures as meeting the standard announced
in Maryland v. Craig.165 Craig requires that deposition testimony taken
outside a defendant’s presence be “necessary to further public policy”
and that its reliability be “otherwise assured.”166 First, the court found
that the elaborate procedures used by the district court assured the testimony’s reliability.167 Second — and more tellingly — the court found
that prosecuting “those bent on inflicting mass civilian casualties or
assassinating high public officials” is, in itself, an “important public
interest.”168 The Fourth Circuit explicitly endorsed this ends-overmeans analysis, saying conclusively that enforcing the requirement for
the defendant to be present at a deposition would preclude the government from using “important testimony.”169
Finally, the government sought to admit classified evidence against
Abu Ali at trial under the Classified Information Procedures Act
(“CIPA”).170 To do so, the district court permitted the government to
employ the “silent witness” method of testimony, in which jurors and a
witness both refer to the same classified document in response to questioning rather than speaking the answers aloud. This procedure avoids
making the underlying information public. Abu Ali himself, however,
would only be able to see a heavily redacted version of the documents
being used against him.171 Moreover, Abu Ali’s defense counsel, who
lacked security clearance, was not permitted to question the government witnesses that would introduce this classified information.172
On review, the Fourth Circuit agreed unanimously that this process
violated Abu Ali’s Confrontation Clause rights.173 Nevertheless, much
like its review of the Miranda violations, the Fourth Circuit found this
Confrontation Clause violation to be merely harmless error.174 The trial
court’s abuse of CIPA was thus relegated to nothing more than a harmless mistake.
Abu Ali presents a situation in which a district court, faced with
the complexities of a terror trial, deviated significantly from established criminal procedural protections to accommodate the government’s interests. As Professor Vladeck notes, the Abu Ali trial “proves
that every case raises its own unique set of practical, procedural, and
substantive challenges. “But . . . where unique national security concerns are implicated, Abu Ali suggests that courts will attempt to reach
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 240–42 (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 850).
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See id. at 241–42.
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See id. at 249; see also 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (Classified Information Procedures Act).
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accommodations that take into account . . . the Government’s interest” along with the defendant’s.175 Indeed, when viewed as a whole,
Abu Ali’s trial resulted in the admission of coerced statements, nonconfrontational deposition testimony, and secret evidence that neither
Abu Ali nor his defense counsel were permitted to review.
These errors, two of which members of the Fourth Circuit thought
unconstitutional, were subsequently deemed harmless. The trial court
bends, and the reviewing court approves. While one cannot extrapolate
Abu Ali to apply to all terrorism cases, it is this trend that should give
pause to those advocating for Article III terror trials. For, upon closer
examination, these measures come troublingly close to those used in
military tribunals. The relaxed Miranda requirements,176 the weighing of the government’s interest in admitting otherwise inadmissible
deposition evidence,177 and the government’s unwillingness to disclose
inculpatory information far above what CIPA protects are all consistent
with military commission regulations.178 Although the procedures that
the district court adopted may have caused no “harm” to Abu Ali, it
is hard to see how approving methods that are equivalent to military
commission regulations is anything but harmful to Article III courts.

V. Conclusion
The pressure to convict “dangerous” terrorists against a backdrop
of a decade-long war has taken its toll on the federal courts. Rather than
vindicating the accused’s constitutional rights in all circumstances, the
federal courts have too often become complicit in distorting them.179
Federal courts have begun to resemble the military tribunal system that
was once defined by how distinct it was from the Article III system. The
past decade has seen federal courts’ power to review executive detention heavily circumscribed. Federal prisons have begun to approximate
See Vladeck, supra note 147.
See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)–(3) (noting that evidence should not be excluded on self-incrimination or coercion grounds except under certain narrow circumstances).
177.
See 10 U.S.C. § 949a (noting that the tribunal court may weigh the probative value of otherwise
inadmissible evidence).
178.
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 949p-1 to 949p-7 (West 2010) (providing that the government cannot be compelled to disclose classified information to anyone not authorized to receive it).
179.
For example, in late April, 2010, trial was set to open in the case of Syed Fahad Hashimi, an
American citizen born abroad and educated in New York. The government’s handling of its case
against Hashimi highlighted many of the dangers of terror trials, including the government’s
success in restricting access to potentially damaging state secrets. See Jeanne Theoharris, The Legal
Black Hole in Southern Manhattan, Slate (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/pagenum/all/#p2. Hashimi, however, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support shortly before trial, precluding an actual trial. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y.,
U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Fed. Court to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to
Al Qaeda (Apr. 27, 2010) (on file with author).
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V. Conclusion
The pressure to convict “dangerous” terrorists against a backdrop
of a decade-long war has taken its toll on the federal courts. Rather than
vindicating the accused’s constitutional rights in all circumstances, the
federal courts have too often become complicit in distorting them.179
Federal courts have begun to resemble the military tribunal system that
was once defined by how distinct it was from the Article III system. The
past decade has seen federal courts’ power to review executive detention heavily circumscribed. Federal prisons have begun to approximate
Guantánamo Bay’s indefinite detention regime, and federal criminal
trial proceedings of terrorists at times bear an eerie resemblance to military commission norms.
As much as one may endorse the apparent move from military
commissions to federal courts, that move should be rejected if it comes
at the cost of scarring the Article III system. Therefore, both those in
favor of military commissions and those in favor of federal court trials should pause. Regardless of whether it may be desirable that the
criminal justice system has the flexibility to adjust to these wartime
conditions, these developments have eviscerated the largest disparities
between the tribunal and criminal spheres. Even persons in favor of a
separate judicial system in the form of tribunals no longer have much
justification for such a proposal.
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For example, in late April, 2010, trial was set to open in the case of Syed Fahad Hashimi, an
American citizen born abroad and educated in New York. The government’s handling of its case
against Hashimi highlighted many of the dangers of terror trials, including the government’s
success in restricting access to potentially damaging state secrets. See Jeanne Theoharris, The Legal
Black Hole in Southern Manhattan, Slate (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/pagenum/all/#p2. Hashimi, however, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support shortly before trial, precluding an actual trial. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y.,
U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Fed. Court to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to
Al Qaeda (Apr. 27, 2010) (on file with author).
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Wars invariably have a corrosive effect on democratic institutions.180
Courts are no different. Perhaps, as some have suggested, the solution
would be to remove courts from the fast-paced business of trying terror
with a common law process.181 However, that solution is too simplistic.
It is apparent that, no matter where terrorists are tried, our societal fear
of the threat they pose has led us to create mirror-image systems that
tend toward kangaroo courts, state secrets, prolonged interrogation,
and indefinite detention. Until we confront and deal with this inclination, any system in which we try terrorists is doomed to repeat these
errors.

For example, in April, 2010, to mixed public reaction, President Obama authorized the assassination of an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, based solely on his suspected involvement with
al-Qaeda. See Alex Rodriguez & David Zucchino, U.S. Drones Leave a Trail of Discord, L.A. Times,
May 2, 2010, at A1 (discussing State Department legal advisor Harold Koh’s approval of the program despite severe disagreement among military and intelligence personnel regarding the targeted killing program); Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to
Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2010, at A12 (noting that “[p]eople on the target list
are considered to be military enemies of the United States and therefore not subject to the ban on
political assassination first approved by President Gerald R. Ford,” and that Representative Jane
Harman, Chairwoman of a House subcommittee on homeland security, described Awlaki as “the
person, the terrorist, who would be terrorist No. 1 in terms of threat against us”). Quoting an unnamed White House official, Shane notes that “[t]he United States works, exactly as the American
people expect, to overcome threats to their security, and this individual — through his own actions — has become one. Awlaki knows what he’s done, and he knows he won’t be met with
handshakes and flowers. None of this should surprise anyone.” Id. The Administration’s recent
support for such a program belies previously held beliefs that targeted killing would be categorically unlawful. Merely five years before the official announcement of the program, Professor (and
later President Obama’s OIRA Director) Cass Sunstein had written hypothetically of exactly such
an executive action and declared it unthinkable under any legal framework. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663, 2663, 2664 (2005). Sustein opined that, “[t]
he President may use ‘all necessary and appropriate force.’ An execution of someone who can be
detained instead is gratuitous; it is neither ‘necessary’ nor ‘appropriate.’” Id. at 2668.
181.
See Jack Goldsmith & Benjamin Wittes, A Role Judges Should Not Have to Play, Wash. Post, Dec.
22, 2009 (noting the exasperation of Judge Thomas F. Hogan of U.S. District Court in Washington,
D.C. with the number and complexity of detainee and terror cases, who claimed that “different
rules of evidence” and “a difference in substantive law” in federal courts “highlights the need
for a national legislative solution with the assistance of the Executive so that these matters are
handled promptly and uniformly and fairly for all concerned.”). Goldsmith and Wittes claim a
dire need for courts to get out of the business of “writing” terror policies, and insist that Congress
should “offer a clear definition of who can be detained, a coherent set of evidentiary and procedural rules to determine who fits the definition of an enemy, and guidance concerning the scope
of the government’s obligation to disclose evidence to detainees’ lawyers.” Id.
180.

